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F. HODGE O'NEAL
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
SYMPOSIUM
STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: A VIEW
FROM THE DEMAND SIDE
JONATHAN R. MACEY*
INTRODUCTION
The study of corporate law stands at an important crossroads. Recent
events have brought into sharp focus a variety of unanswered questions
and interesting and important contradictions inherent in much of the re-
ceived wisdom about corporate governance. For example, it often is ar-
gued that corporate takeovers transfer wealth from firms' corporate
stakeholders-particularly their bondholders and employees-to their
shareholders.' On the other hand, it also is argued that the regulation of
corporate takeovers under state law transfers wealth from shareholders
to these very same stakeholders-bondholders and corporate employees.2
It is mysterious why the shareholders should be so successful at effectuat-
ing intra-firm wealth transfers, and yet be so unsuccessful at accomplish-
ing legislative wealth transfers.
Similarly, the received wisdom in corporate law is that Delaware has
dominated the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters either by
winning a "race for the bottom"3 or else by winning a "race for the
top."' These rival theories depict Delaware as "captured" by a single
* B.A., 1977, Harvard College, J.D., 1982, Yale Law School. Professor of Law, The Univer-
sity of Chicago.
1. The principal exponent of this view has been Morey McDaniel. See McDaniel, Bondhold-
ers and Stockholders, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 205 (1988).
2. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1986).
3. The phrase "race for the bottom" was coined by Professor William Cary. See Cary, Feder-
alism and Corporate Law Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974). The phrase is
derived from the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
557-60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251, 254 (1977).
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interest group, either managers (as in the race to the bottom theory) or
shareholders (as in the race for the top theory). These interest groups
purportedly craft Delaware law to suit their own ends at the expense of
all other interested groups. But Delaware's passage of a tough antitake-
over statute has cast considerable doubt on the validity of the thesis that
Delaware law reflects victory in a "race for the top" designed to maxi-
mize shareholders' wealth. And the failure of Pennsylvania to attract
significant new chartering business as a result of its outrageously restric-
tive new antitakeover law casts equal doubt on the validity of the "race
for the bottom" thesis. That thesis would predict that Pennsylvania, as
the state with the most comprehensive array of defenses for incumbent
management, should win the competition for corporate charters.
Perhaps the most glaring unanswered question in the dominant theo-
retical models of corporate law concerns the relationship between state
and federal law. The statement that the internal rules of corporate gov-
ernance are creatures of state law simply is no longer accurate. Federal
administrative agencies, particularly the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC or Commission) are increasingly willing to promulgate
rules and render administrative decisions that encroach on the tradi-
tional province of state law by making significant incursions into the in-
ternal decisionmaking processes of individual firms.
This Article argues that the key to understanding the complex regula-
tory environment in which the modern United States corporation is
forced to operate lies in understanding the nature of the underlying
groups who stand to win or lose as that environment changes. It is the
thesis of this paper that, while corporate law has always reflected the
outcome of a competitive struggle among rival groups for preferential
treatment in the regulatory process, in recent years the stakes involved in
this struggle have risen dramatically as a conseqence of the costs and
benefits imposed on these groups by the market for corporate control.
As those stakes have gone up, new groups have been induced to enter the
regulatory fray. In particular, groups such as labor unions, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE or Exchange), and even local groups, such
as art museums and other civic organizations, have found it in their in-
terests to make their voices heard by regulators.
This Article observes that these interest groups do not take their cases
to a randomly selected group of regulators. Rather, these groups natu-
rally seek hearings with those regulators that they believe will be most
sympathetic and responsive to their viewpoints. Generally, a particular
[Vol. 69:383
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interest group would prefer to deal with the regulators with whom it has
established a preexisting relationship, or at least a pattern of repeated
dealings. Sometimes these regulators happen to be state regulators, and
sometimes these regulators turn out to be federal regulators.
Thus, this Article concludes that state and federal law in the takeover
sphere has not developed in response to any coherent pattern or model
that is consistent with the "public interest." Indeed, it is misleading to
suggest that any sort of coherent "relationship" between state and federal
law actually exists. Rather, both state and federal law reflect the outcome
of struggles by rival interest groups, acting through their favored regula-
tory agencies, to obtain regulation that serves their own, private interests.
The source of a particular rule or regulation is not determined on the
basis of any neutral principle about the benefits of a local as opposed to a
national rule. Rather, lawmaking bodies will issue regulations in re-
sponse to the demands of their constituents, regardless of the implica-
tions of that regulatory solution for the relationship between state and
federal law.
When a particular lawmaking body has numerous constituencies, the
regulations it creates will reflect a compromise designed to maximize the
aggregate political support available to the lawmakers from all relevant
groups. Thus, the regulatory patterns simply will reflect the extent to
which particular interest groups enjoy access to particular sources of law.
When viewed from a public interest perspective, the sources of regulation
that we observe may appear random or nonsensical. But when viewed
from the perspective of the relevant interest groups, a rational framework
for the pattern of regulation emerges.
Section I of this Article contains a discussion of the mechanics of inter-
est group theory as that theory applies to corporate law. Section II illus-
trates the Article's thesis by examining three important sources of
regulation in the market for corporate control: Congress, the SEC, and
the states. First, I argue that Congress has responded to the increased
political stakes associated with the modern market for corporate control
by testing the regulatory waters. That testing triggered the dramatic
stock market crash of October 1987, and caused Congress to conclude
that the political costs of further regulation of the market for corporate
control outweighed the gains.
Next, the SEC's role in the regulation of corporate takeovers is consid-
ered. The SEC regulates the market for corporate control in a number of
ways, some subtle and some quite overt. But all of the SEC's regulations
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
386 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the market for corporate control respond to the preferences of a dis-
crete interest group or groups. As with Congress and the SEC, state
regulation of the corporate control market also is responsive to the de-
mands of interest groups, but, as might be expected, the interest groups
that dominate state legislatures not only differ from the interest groups
that dominate the SEC, they also vary from state to state.
Finally, in Section III, the Article considers the Supreme Court's role
in fashioning the ground rules that govern the market for corporate con-
trol. This section shows that the Court has decided not to impede the
rather obvious attempts by certain states to interfere with interstate com-
merce. I will argue that the only plausible explanation for the Court's
inactivity lies in its mysterious desire to protect Congress from the polit-
ical costs of regulating a field in which the political costs of regulation are
greater than the benefits of such regulation.
I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: INTEREST GROUP THEORY
Interest group theory recognizes that the majority of government ac-
tivity is devoted to the transfer of resources among citizens. Government
is treated as a firm that supplies a product. That product is called legisla-
tion, and it is treated as a "good demanded and supplied much as other
goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the
greatest value from it, regardless of overall social welfare . . . ." Accord-
ing to interest group theory, individual citizens both supply laws, by pay-
ing taxes and bearing other regulatory burdens, and demand laws, by
organizing into special interest groups in order to supply political sup-
port to politicians in exchange for legislation that transfers wealth to
themselves from the politically powerless.
Interest group theory further posits that politicians maximize the ag-
gregate political support they receive from all interest groups. At the
margin, the legislature will enact a rule if the resulting gain in political
support outweighs any expected loss in political support, either from the
public or from a rival group. Thus, contrary to popular belief, interest
group theory is "inconsistent with the rather primitive 'capture theory' of
economic regulation which posits that one particular interest group
rather than a group of interest groups drives legislation or regulation." 6
5. Posner, Economics, Politics; and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cti. L.
REv. 263, 265 (1982).
6. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
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According to the interest group theory of government, politicians
maximize their political support both by acting as brokers among preex-
isting interest groups and by acting as entrepreneurs, creating new mar-
kets for their products:
As a broker, [a regulator] gains political support by transferring resources
among the various groups in society. As an entrepreneur he seeks to create
groups that he can benefit, in order to receive political support from them.
[This] discussion implies not only that certain sorts of groups are more ef-
fective in obtaining desirable legislation, but also that certain sorts of issues
will be most attractive to entrepreneurial politicians.7
The ability of individuals to organize into effective interest groups will
be determined by their ability to overcome the information costs and or-
ganization costs that plague all individuals who attempt to seek favors
from the government.8 Information costs impede individuals who seek
wealth transfers for two reasons. First, it is costly for an individual to
identify and ascertain the effects that a particular issue will have on his
welfare. Second, even when an individual knows the likely effects of an
issue, it is costly for that individual to identify other similarly-situated
individuals to join him in his quest for legislation.9 As I have noted in
another context:
[E]ven before we get to the issue of the relative efficiency of interest groups
in the political sphere, we must realize that for most people it simply does
not pay to become sufficiently well informed on most issues to have an opin-
ion, much less to attempt the outcome. Where a piece of legislation will
cost a taxpayer $50.00 and the net cost of obtaining information about the
effects of the legislation (including the opportunity costs of the taxpayer's
time, and the start-up costs of identifying the issue) are greater than $50.00,
no rational taxpayer will obtain the information to begin to affect legislative
outcomes. 10
Another reason why individual voters, if they are rational, will refrain
from wasting resources by informing themselves of the details surround-
ing the legislative process is that their votes do not matter. Individual
votes do not matter because the probability that an individual's vote will
CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46 (1988) (citing Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. ScI. 335 (1974)).
7. Id. at 46.
8. R. MCCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY 16
(1981).
9. Id. at 17.
10. Macey, supra note 6, at 47.
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be decisive on a particular issue "is effectively zero.""1
The way that individuals can effect legislative outcomes is by organiz-
ing into political coalitions or interest groups. Interest groups enable in-
dividuals to overcome the information costs that face individual voters.
But some individuals organize into interest groups and others do not.
This is because different individuals face different organization costs
when they attempt to form political coalitions. In particular, if an indi-
vidual already has joined a group for a nonpolitical reason, it will be
relatively easy to turn that group into a political coalition. Examples of
groups formed for nonpolitical purposes that have evolved into effective
political coalitions include corporations, labor unions, and trade associa-
tions, such as the American Medical Association, the American Bar As-
sociation, and the American Association of University Professors.
These sorts of organizations "not only benefit their members by over-
coming the informational problems faced by individuals in the political
process, they also benefit their members by employing a variety of de-
vices to mitigate the free-rider problems that inhibit the wealth transfer
process."" The free-rider problem inhibits the wealth transfer process
because individual members of interest groups have incentives to allow
other group members to bear the costs of lobbying for wealth transfers,
since these individuals will share any benefits obtained by their more in-
dustrious colleagues. Rational interest group members will anticipate
this problem and devise a system of internal rewards and sanctions to
cope with it. 3 The more effective the group is at overcoming its free-
rider problems, the more successful it will be at obtaining wealth
transfers.
The foregoing discussion has been a rather straightforward rendition
of the economic theory of regulation. 4 This theory, which is now almost
universally accepted among economists, 5 and is "[e]spoused by an odd
mixture of welfare state liberals, muckrakers, Marxists, and free-market
economists"' 16 should by now be familiar to every law student interested
in the operation of the regulatory state.
11. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 191, 193 (1988).
12. Macey, supra note 6, at 48.
13. M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS, 17-29 (1982).
14. For the more detailed treatments on which the foregoing discussion is based, see Macey,
supra note 6.
15. Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON.
REv. 279 (1984).
16. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MOMT. Sci. 335, 335 (1974).
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The economic theory of regulation is a "new development" that "al-
ready has begun to provide new insights into the role and effect of polit-
ical institutions."" In general, the economic theory of legislation has
treated Congress as a monopolist, that is, as the sole supplier of legisla-
tion to interest groups. 8 This treatment of Congress should strike law-
yers as peculiar. In particular, state courts, state legislatures, and federal
administrative agencies all appear to be important rivals to the federal
government in that they appear to constitute additional potential sources
of legislation for interest groups.
Treating Congress as a monolithic supplier of regulation, however, is
not as unrealistic as it might appear at first blush. As McGubbins, Noll,
and Weingast pointed out in a recent article that already has become a
classic, Congress has been able to devise organizational structures and
incentive mechanisms that align the interests of the bureaucrats within
administrative agencies with their own.1 9 In particular, the close over-
sight of administrative agencies permitted by Congress' committee sys-
tem and Congress' ability to control budgetary allocations to
administrative agencies give it surprisingly tight control over the policy
preferences and regulatory outcomes generated by administrative
agencies.
Congress also retains considerable power to control the regulatory
agenda in the states. Congress can utilize its power under the commerce
clause to regulate virtually all aspects of economic life. And, of course,
the supremacy clause gives Congress the ability to trump state law on
any issue it chooses. Consequently, even though the states continue to
serve as the primary source of regulation, the ability of the states to regu-
late depends almost entirely on Congress' willingness to forbear from
regulating.20 As I have pointed out in another context, Congress will be
willing to forbear from regulating if, and only if such forbearance is the
best way for Congress to maximize its own political support.2
Thus the key to determining the regulatory pattern in a given industry
lies in the nature of the preferences of the interest groups that are being
17. Weingast, The Political Institutions of Representative Government, J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL EcON., 693, 693 (1989).
18. Id.
19. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989).
20. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: To-
ward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990).
21. Id.
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regulated. These groups will cause Congress either to pass laws directly,
or else they will cause it to allocate the regulatory authority over a partic-
ular issue to a regulatory agency, such as the SEC, or to the states. The
preferences of the interest groups subject to regulation will depend, in
large part, on the interest groups' cost of access. An interest group that
has established a pattern of repeat dealing with a particular agency is
likely to turn to that agency when it needs to obtain a regulatory prefer-
ence. Similarly, the bureaucracy itself may develop preferences over
time. Inevitably these preferences will be tied to the interests of the
groups they regulate. This is because agencies can no longer justify their
existence if the groups they regulate go out of business. Consequently,
acts that threaten the welfare of an interest group also threaten the wel-
fare of its client regulatory agency.
The following section explores the factors that have influenced the al-
location of regulation concerning tender offers among the interested
sources of regulation: the SEC, the states, and Congress.
II. SOURCES OF REGULATION
A. Congress
The takeover business is a high stakes game. High stakes games pro-
vide Congress with many opportunities to obtain political support both
through contributions, and through the publicity that media coverage of
congressional proceedings can provide. Thus it is rather surprising that
the 1980s produced virtually no takeover legislation of any substance.
Congress has remained content to relegate primary regulatory responsi-
bility to the SEC and to the states.
The reason Congress prefers to refrain from regulating in the takeover
arena is clear. The costs of such regulation are greater than the benefits.
Any doubts about the political cost-benefit calculation associated with
federal intervention in the market for corporate control were laid to rest
in October 1987 when proposed tax changes that would have severely
impeded the market for corporate control triggered the most dramatic
decline in shareholder wealth in United States history.
A careful study by Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter examines news
stories about the proposed legislation that came across the financial news
wires shortly before the crash. Using sophisticated financial econometric
techniques, Mitchell and Netter are able to pinpoint the exact time the
news reached the market. They are then able to show precisely how the
[Vol. 69:383
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market reacted to the unanticipated news.22
During the so-called market break of October 1987, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average of New York Stock Exchange listed securities
dropped 508 points, and the New York Stock Exchange lost $1 trillion in
value.23 The decline in the Dow represented a loss of 22.6 percent of the
value of that index. This crash, which had begun on Wednesday, Octo-
ber 14, 1987, was the most extreme one-week decline in the market's
history.24 The most promising explanation for the October 1987 events
is that the market crash was triggered by proposed tax changes intro-
duced in the House Ways and Means Committee on the evening of Octo-
ber 13, 1987, and approved on the evening of October 15, 1987.25 These
proposed tax changes would have stifled the market for corporate control
by reducing the tax advantages associated with making a takeover bid.
In particular, the proposed changes in the taxation of corporate control
transactions would have limited deductions for interest expenses exceed-
ing $5 million a year on debt incurred to finance takeovers and leveraged
buyouts. The proposed legislation also eliminated the ability of an ac-
quiror to use mirror subsidiaries to dispose of target assets without a
recognition of the corporate level gain. Finally, 'the proposed bill
contained:
several provisions specifically designed to restrict hostile takeovers. Interest
deductions on any debt used to finance a hostile takeover attempt of over 20
percent of a target's stock or assets would be prohibited. The bill would
have required a hostile bidder to treat an acquisition of stock as a purchase
of assets with immediate corporate recognition of the difference between the
target's basis in its assets and the purchase price. The proposal also in-
cluded a 50% nondeductible excise tax on profits from greenmail
payments.26
The stated purpose of the legislation was to prevent hostile
acquisitions:
The House Ways and Means [C]ommittee believes that corporate acquisi-
tions that lack the consent of the acquired corporation are detrimental to
the general economy as well as to the welfare of the acquired corporation's
22. Mitchell & Netter, Triggering the 1987 Stock Market Crash: Antitakeover Provisions in the
Proposed House Ways and Means Committee Tax Bill, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 37, 43-48 (1989).
23. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (Brady Report)
1, 1 (1988), Special Rep. No. 1267 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Jan. 12, 1988).
24. Mitchell & Netter, supra note 22, at 37.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 39.
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employees and community. The committee therefore believes it is appro-
priate not only to remove the tax incentives for corporate acquisitions, but
to create tax disincentives for such acquisitions.27
Far from being detrimental to the general economy, takeovers, partic-
ularly hostile takeovers, are in fact highly beneficial to the economy in
general and to target firm shareholders in particular.28 When a takeover
attempt is announced, target firm shareholders receive an average take-
over premium of twenty-five to thirty-five percent.29 Recent studies have
found average gains to target firm shareholders to be as high as 53.2
percent.30 These gains to target firm shareholders strongly suggest that
takeovers are good for the economy generally. Gains to target firm
shareholders suggest either that target firm shares are currently under-
valued in the market, or else that the assets of the target firm are capable
of attaining a higher value if reorganized or managed by a different man-
agement team.31 In light of the plethora of empirical evidence showing
that the capital markets are efficient, 32 the latter explanation clearly
emerges as the most convincing:
The restructuring of corporate America... that is being brought about by
the takeover market is streamlining many of the largest and most complex
corporations that are simply too large, too complicated, and too unfocused
to be efficient. Restructuring is bringing top level managers closer to em-
ployees, customers and shareholders. We must not strangle these produc-
tive forces.33
The negative effects of legislation imposing prohibitive tax restrictions
on corporations are not limited to those individual firms that happen to
be involved in takeovers at the particular time the legislation is intro-
duced. As Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel have observed, managers
of all firms have incentives to be more productive if they have reason to
believe that a hostile takeover is a possibility. Because managers of ac-
quired firms generally are displaced,34 the threat of takeover provides
27. Id. (citing legislative history).
28. Macey, State Anti-takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467.
29. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FiN.
ECON. 5 (1983).
30. Comment & Jarrell, Two Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1987).
31. Macey, supra note 28, at 471.
32. See Jensen, Some Anomolous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. EcON. 95
("there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it
than the Efficient Market Hypothesis").
33. Jensen, A Helping Hand for Entrenched Managers, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 36, col. 6.
34. Id.
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managers with a strong incentive to maximize firm value in order to
avoid a hostile acquisition. Thus "shareholders benefit [from tender offer
bids] even if their corporation never is the subject of a tender offer. The
process of monitoring by outsiders poses a continuous threat of takeover
if performance lags. Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in
order to reduce the chance of takeover .. .
Thus, it is not surprising that a bill imposing a tax penalty on hostile
takeovers would have "wide ranging detrimental effects on stock
prices."'3 6 Consistent with the hypothesis that the antitakeover provi-
sions of the House Ways and Means tax bill triggered the stock market
crash, Mitchell and Netter show beyond any reasonable doubt that the
market declined on news that the House was likely to impose meaningful
restrictions on takeovers, and rose on news that the House was dropping
most antitakeover provisions from its tax package.37
Mitchell and Netter also show that rival explanations for the stock
market decline are less convincing than their antitakeover tax hypothesis.
One popular explanation for the crash offered at the time was that it
resulted from the Commerce Department's October 14, 1987 announce-
ment of trade-deficit figures for August 1987. The announced deficit of
$15.68 billion was $0.79 billion smaller than the previous month's deficit
of $16.47 billion, but it was slightly higher than expected. Mitchell and
Netter show that little of the decline on October 14 is attributable to the
trade deficit announcement.3 8 Similarly, news of rising interest rates, or
use of program trading strategies, such as portfolio insurance and risk
arbitrage, cannot be said to have triggered the crash.39
Thus, while members of Congress could garner substantial political
support for themselves in exchange for tampering with the market for
corporate control, the efficiency of the stock market is such that the neg-
ative effects of this tampering would be felt almost immediately. Not
surprisingly, this experience dampened Congress' interest in displacing
the states from their traditional role as the primary suppliers of corporate
35. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1981).
36. Mitchell & Netter, supra note 22, at 40.
37. Mitchell and Netter isolate five discrete event dates when news about the progress of the
takeover tax was publicly disclosed. For each of these event dates, t-values based on the cross-
section variance estimate reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance at the 0.001 level.
Mitchell & Netter, supra note 22, at 46.
38. Id. at 57.
39. Id at 57-59.
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law. As long as the political costs from regulating are higher than the
political gains, we may continue to expect Congress to search for other
ways to meddle in the economy.
This explanation for Congress' willingness to defer regulatory author-
ity to the states is consistent with the trenchant insight made by political
scientists such as Morris Fiorina' ° and Kenneth Shepsle:4  the optimal
political strategy for politicians faced with particularly controversial or
uncertain legislative issues is to refrain from regulating, either by ab-
staining altogether, or else by delegating the matter to an administrative
agency. And, when a regulatory matter is particularly controversial, the
optimal regulatory strategy may be to turn the matter over to the states
in order to insulate Congress from the political fallout associated with
legislating in that area. This is because "Congress is more likely to be
held accountable for regulatory actions taken by administrative agencies
than it is for similar actions taken by states. In addition, Congress can
justify virtually any decision to delegate a controversial policy matter to
the states simply by uttering vague tributes to the virtues of
federalism."42
B. The SEC
The SEC has consistently taken a laissezfaire position with regard to
the desirability of takeover regulation that essentially reflects the free-
market policy preferences of the executive rather than the interventionist
proclivities of Congress. Indeed, the SEC went so far as to suggest that
shareholders be allowed to opt out of certain provisions of the Williams
Act.
43
The SEC also has taken an activist position as an advocate in courts
and state legislatures in support of its position that the market for corpo-
rate control should be unregulated.' In both CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
40. Fiorina, Legislative Choice ofRegulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process? 39
PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982).
41. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 555 (1972).
42. Macey, supra note 20, at 285.
43. Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control: Advance Notice of
Possible Commission Actions [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84.018 at
88,199 (Mar. 9, 1987).
44. See Palmiter, The CTS Gambit: Stanching the Federalization of Corporate Law, 69 WASH,
U.L.Q. 445 (1991).
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Corp. of America45 and Edgar v. MITE,46 the SEC filed amicus briefs
supporting the position that state antitakeover statutes are unconstitu-
tional as violative of the commerce clause. The SEC has publicly decried
the wave of state antitakeover statutes that followed CTS.47
It is, of course, possible that the SEC's opposition to state law restric-
tions on the market for corporate control simply arises from a principled
commitment to a free market ideology. But this is highly unlikely in
light of the SEC's opposition to free market solutions to problems in
other areas. For example, the SEC long has refused to acknowledge the
validity of market-oriented arguments with respect to insider trading is-
sues, and instead has steadfastly clung to the position that insider trading
must be banned because it is "unfair." 48 Even more to the point, the
SEC consistently has supported the Williams Act,49 which imposes se-
vere impediments on the market for corporate control by forcing bidders
to disclose their identity and plans upon launching a tender offer or
within ten days of acquiring five percent of another firm's stock via
purchases that do not constitute a tender offer." This requirement se-
verely impedes the operation of the market for corporate control because
it deprives potential bidders of much of the incentive to invest the re-
sources necessary to launch a hostile bid for another firm's shares. 1
It seems likely that the SEC supports the Williams Act restrictions on
the market for corporate control at the same time that it opposes state
law interference with the market for corporate control because the Wil-
liams Act increases the demand for the SEC's services as an administra-
tive agency; state laws regulating the market for corporate control
diminish the demand for the SEC's influence. If the states were prohib-
ited from regulating the market for corporate control, interest groups'
demand for regulation necessarily would shift from the state legislatures
to the SEC. By contrast, if the Williams Act were repealed, then the
45. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
46. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
47. Palmiter, supra note 44.
48. See Macey, From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions: The New, New Direction of the
Rules Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REv. 355 (1988).
49. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
50. Though the SEC has suggested that the idea of allowing shareholders to opt out of the
Williams Act be considered, no realistic possibility that this suggestion would be adopted ever
existed.
51. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Market for Corporate Control, and the Regu-
lation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9-18 (1978).
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demand for the SEC's services as a provider and interpreter of rules
would decline. Thus, the agency's desire to expand its bureaucratic turf,
rather then a principled economic perspective, informs the SEC's policy
positions with respect to the market for corporate control.
Consistent with the interest group perspective to political behavior
taken in this Article, it is no surprise that the SEC's policy positions are
consistent with the business interests of the SEC's most powerful constit-
uencies-investment bankers and corporate lawyers. These constituen-
cies want to maximize their own revenues, which means that the legal
regime governing takeovers must be sufficiently complex so as to create a
need for lawyers and investment bankers' services, but not so complex as
to reduce the number of deals. Thus, while target firm shareholders
would want to maximize the number of successful takeovers by outside
bidders, and target firm managers would want to minimize the number of
successful bids, the lawyers and investment bankers who comprise the
SEC's natural constituency prefer to maximize their own revenues. This
requires a regulatory strategy different from the one that either share-
holders or managers would prefer. The rules administered by the SEC
come far closer to maximizing lawyer and investment banker revenues
than the rules promulgated by state legislatures. This is because target
managers are a natural constituency of state legislatures, while lawyers
and investment bankers are the natural constituency of the SEC.
Thus, demand for the SEC's services would increase if state antitake-
over statutes were declared unconstitutional. The SEC would find itself
once again in the enviable position of being the dominant supplier of
takeover legislation, and this would enable the agency to increase the
amount of political support it receives from various groups.
The substantive positions taken by the SEC with regard to the regula-
tion of the market for corporate control both maximize the SEC's aggre-
gate political support from various interest groups and reflect the
outcomes that those groups most prefer. The SEC advocates that states
adopt efficient rules with regard to the market for corporate control be-
cause efficient rules restrict the ability of the states to interfere with the
SEC's rule-making prerogatives. But the SEC's regulation of insider
trading cannot be justified on the grounds that it promotes the goals of
efficiency, fairness, or market integrity. Rather, the regulations promul-
gated by the SEC "reflect a hodgepodge of special interest concerns."1
5 2
52. Macey, supra note 48, at 379.
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The SEC's recent involvement in the one-share, one-vote controversy
that pitted the New York Stock Exchange against certain of its more
powerful listed firms provides a useful illustration of this point. The
NYSE long had an internal rule that prohibited listed firms from issuing
dual class common stock of any kind.53 During the mid-to-late 1980s,
however, the incumbent management of several NYSE listed firms dis-
covered that listing multiple classes of stock with different voting rights
provided an effective mechanism for reducing the threat of hostile take-
over. In general, a dual class recapitalization would create capital struc-
tures with two classes of common stock. One class, held by incumbent
managers and their affiliates, would have much higher voting rights than
the class held by the public. A dual class recapitalization effectively
makes a hostile takeover of the firm virtually impossible because upon
completion of the recapitalization, incumbent management and its allies
are able to retain control of the target firm's board of directors. For this
reason commentators voiced the opinion that "the move toward dual
class common stock portends the most important shift in the underlying
structure of corporate governance since the rise of institutional stock
ownership."54
The NYSE firms that proposed to offer two classes of common stock
were playing a "chicken game" with the NYSE. These firms realized
that the NYSE's only meaningful sanction for breaching its rule against
dual class stock was to delist the transgressing firms. The NYSE knew
that the loss of revenues associated with such delistings would hurt it at
least as much as the firms being delisted. This was particularly true be-
cause firms delisted from the Exchange simply could migrate to the over-
the-counter market or to the American Stock Exchange, both of which
permitted firms to issue multiple classes of common stock. The NYSE
appealed to the SEC for its assistance in resolving this controversy. The
SEC could have used this opportunity to employ its rulemaking author-
53. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313 (1987). The rule dated from 1926. See Fis-
chel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CH. L. REv.
119, 120 (1987).
54. See Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder
Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 4 (1988).
55. The National Association of Securities Dealers, the self-regulatory body that has regulatory
responsibility over the over-the-counter markets, placed no limitations on firms' ability to issue dual
class stock. The American Stock Exchange permitted firms to issue dual class stock, but listed only
those classes with rights to elect 25% of a firm's board of directors. Gordon, supra note 54, at 5
(citations omitted).
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ity to facilitate the market for corporate control; instead, it adopted rule
19c-4, which reflects a compromise position designed to protect the
NYSE, while leaving the states free to permit firms to use dual class
stock as a means of thwarting takeovers. 6 Rule 19c-4 prohibits all stock
exchanges as well as the National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotation System from listing the common stock of any firm that
undertakes a recapitalization which reduces the per-share voting rights of
any existing common shareholders. But the SEC's rule excludes various
takeover defensive mechanisms. In particular, rule 19c-4 excludes state
control share acquisition statutes, poison pills, and stock lock-ups, all of
which have the effect of creating disproportionate voting rights in certain
shareholders, generally by reducing the voting rights of acquirors for the
purpose of protecting incumbent management against hostile bidders.
Rule 19c-4 protects the New York Stock Exchange, one of the SEC's
most valuable constituent interest groups, but does not prevent incum-
bent management teams from obtaining some of the benefits of dispro-
portionate voting rights. The SEC could have used its authority to
prevent firms from delisting from the Exchange to avoid its rules, but this
would have brought down the considerable wrath, not to mention lobby-
ing skills, of business groups such as the Business Roundtable. Alterna-
tively, the SEC could have supported the free-market solution of
allowing the various exchanges and the over-the-counter market to adopt
whatever rules they see fit and letting the chips fall where they may.
57
But this would have imposed severe costs on the NYSE, and therefore
would have cost the SEC valuable political support. In the end, the com-
promise position reached by the Commission can only be explained as a
means of protecting the SEC's own political position at the expense of its
principles.
C. The States
The politicization of state corporate law rules is manifest. The high
stakes game in corporate law is takeovers. Takeovers help target firm
shareholders and the economy in general, but they harm incumbent man-
agers. Takeovers help target shareholders because of the substantial pre-
miums such shareholders enjoy when their firms are subject to a bid.5"
56. Securities Exchange Act Rule 19c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990).
57. Fischel, supra note 53, at 121-27.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (describing takeover premia for target
shareholders).
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Takeovers enhance the economy by ensuring that ineffective or corrupt
incumbent managment teams are replaced and that society's resources
are channeled to those who are able to employ them in their most pro-
ductive uses. 9
By contrast, state statutes that impede the market for corporate con-
trol will result in less monitoring of managers of all firms, less efficient
deployment of society's resources, and a greater number of corporate
bankruptcies and reorganizations.' State legislatures have responded to
the problem of defensive tactics that transfer wealth from shareholders to
managers by impeding the market for corporate control by passing a host
of statutes that make these sorts of wealth transfers even easier. State
legislatures and incumbent managers have, in effect, ganged up on corpo-
rate shareholders in order to deprive them of the benefits of the market
for corporate control. The explanation for this is clear. Incumbent man-
agement teams represent a powerful in-state lobby, while shareholders
are widely dispersed throughout the country.61 State politicians are only
too happy to pass laws that transfer wealth from politically ineffectual,
out-of-state shareholders to politically powerful local managers.
At this point it might be tempting to argue in favor of federal preemp-
tion of state corporate law, since the federal law of takeovers, while
favorable to incumbent managers at the expense of shareholders,62 gener-
ally is less confiscatory than state law, particularly after the recent wave
of state antitakeover statutes. But the point of this Article is to argue
that this sort of public policy calculus is irrelevant because it ignores the
fact that the states have no independent regulatory authority. The states
regulate at the pleasure of Congress. Congress has declined to intervene
in the states' efforts to impair the market for corporate control because
non-intervention benefits Congress politically. In light of the federal gov-
ernment's broad authority under the supremacy clause to preempt local
rules, 63 interest group theory predicts that Congress will choose to dele-
gate regulatory issues to the states only when the political support it ob-
tains from deferring exceeds the political support it obtains from
regulating itself.64
59. Macey, supra note 28, at 485-87.
60. Id.
61. See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
62. Macey, supra note 28, at 489.
63. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985); Ninefor the
Seesaw, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1985, at 21.
64. Macey, supra note 20, at 267.
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The reason that Congress has declined to preempt the states is clearly
not because Congress is concerned that it could not regulate as effectively
as the states. Rather, the reason Congress forbears from regulating is
because it, like the state legislatures themselves, obtains political support
for deferring to the states. By deferring to the states on the takeover
issue, Congress is able to deflect the responsibility for a-set of legal rules
that strangle the economy and transfer billions of dollars in shareholder
wealth to incumbent management teams. Congress also is able to ap-
pease powerful interest groups such as the Business Roundtable, which
represents top management at major corporations, and is adamantly op-
posed to a free market for corporate control.
III. THE COURTS
The preceding discussion has painted a rather bleak picture of the
political process. Bureaucrats, as well as politicians, at both the state and
local levels are depicted as self-interested economic actors, trying to ad-
vance their own political goals, often at the expense of the disaggregated
"general public" they ostensibly were chosen to protect. Bureaucrats de-
pend on politicians for their political survival. Politicians respond to in-
terest group pressures for a number of reasons. Most obviously, political
survival requires the economic support of interest groups:
Interest groups influence the political process by such overt methods as
promises of political support, campaign contributions, and outright bribes,
and by slightly more subtle methods such as investing in congressional re-
tirement funds. Another common method of influence is paying congress-
men honoraria for speaking engagements. 6
5
In addition to interest groups' ability to influence lawmakers' thinking
through financial incentives, such groups also influence the policymaking
process by controlling the flow of information to decisionmakers. Much
special interest legislation transfers wealth from some disaggregated
group (like shareholders) to some other, relatively cohesive group (like
incumbent management). The disaggregated individuals paying for the
wealth transfers do not have the incentives to invest the resources to
mount a lobbying campaign to counter the lobbying of the interest
groups. Similarly, of course, the disaggregated individuals who are the
suppliers of legislative wealth transfers do not supply policymakers with
65. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Inter-
est Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230 (1986).
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information about their positions on various issues. As a result, the in-
terest groups with a stake in a particular legislative wealth transfer pro-
gram generally will control the flow of information about the issue to the
relevant legislators. With regard to complex issues, this control of infor-
mation enables interest groups "to distort congressmen's thinking on an
issue-normally all an interest group needs to achieve its ends."66 Thus
the simple fact that information is costly to obtain and disseminate
means that legislators often pass special interest legislation really believ-
ing they are acting in the public interest.67
The interest group analysis of government behavior is generally ac-
cepted among economists and seems hardly controversial. The remain-
ing difficult theoretical and empirical issue concerns the role of the
federal courts within the economic theory of legislation. On this issue
academics who subscribe to interest group theory appear to divide into
two camps. One camp comprises the followers of William Landes and
Richard Posner, who claim that the existence of an independent federal
judiciary furthers the ability of special interest groups to transfer wealth
to themselves from the population as a whole.68 In the other camp are
those, such as myself, who argue that the independent federal judiciary
hinders the ability of special interests to dominate the legislative
process.69
Landes and Posner recognize that interest groups and politicians who
attempt to enter into special interest group bargains face severe con-
tracting problems related to enforceability. In particular, Landes and
Posner observe that if the parties to a contract believe that the bargain
they are striking is unenforceable, the value of that contract will be sig-
nificantly diminished. As a consequence, like other contracting parties,
interest groups and politicians have a strong incentive to ensure that the
deals they strike will be enforceable.7" Landes and Posner argue that the
federal judiciary serves as an independent enforcement mechanism for
these deals. Thus, according to Landes and Posner, the independent ju-
diciary facilitates special interest groups' ability to effectuate wealth
transfers through the legislative process by providing the "stability or
66. Easterbrook, What's Wrong With Congress?, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 57, 70-72.
67. Macey, supra note 65, at 231.
68. Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. &
ECON. 875, 894 (1986) (the court's role is to enforce the deals that special interests groups obtain
from the legislature).
69. Macey, supra note 65.
70. Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 877.
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continuity necessary to enable interest-group politics to operate in the
legislative arena .... 71
The ability of legislators to offer special interest groups permanent
rather than short-term deals increases the income of legislators who en-
act such rules. The stability or continuity provided by the federal judici-
ary in the Landes and Posner model enables members of the current
legislature to capture their full share of the present value of a wealth
transfer program designed to run in perpetuity, even if they plan to leave
the legislature at the end of the current session. 2
As proof of their theory that federal judges act as enforcers of special
interest group bargains, Landes and Posner offer, as an empirical test,
evidence that the Supreme Court has only rarely nullified acts of Con-
gress on constitutional grounds. They do not, however, offer any ration-
ale for why article III judges find it to be in their interests to uphold
special interest groups' deals with legislatures. After all, these judges
cannot be fired and cannot have their salaries reduced during their terms
of office. In addition, unlike legislators, these judges do not obtain any
tangible benefits from interest groups for acting on their behalf. Thus, it
is difficult to imagine what incentive judges have to enforce the deals that
interest groups make with politicians.
I elaborate on some of these observations in an article discussing the
role of the independent judiciary from an interest group perspective. 73 I
argue that federal judges can invalidate interest group deals through the
process of statutory interpretation as well as through the process of con-
stitutional invalidation. Judicial invalidation through statutory interpre-
tation allows federal judges to protect the public from the welfare-
reducing consequences of legislative wealth transfers without the risk of a
direct constitutional confrontation with Congress.
The Supreme Court's decisions on the constitutionality of state laws
restricting takeovers provide an extremely useful lens through which to
view the response of the Court to interest group legislation promulgated
by the states. The Court's major decisions in this area are, of course,
Edgar v. MITE, 74 and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.75 In
71. Id. at 878.
72. Aranson, Judicial Control of the Political Branches: Public Purpose and Public Law, 4
CATO J. 719, 731-32 (1985) (discussing implications of Landes and Posner's theory).
73. Macey, supra note 65.
74. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
75. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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1982, the Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois antitakeover statute in
Edgar v. MITE, and in 1987 the Supreme Court validated an Indiana
antitakeover statute at least as confiscatory as the Illinois statute.
Taken together, these decisions present a coherent picture of the
Supreme Court's attitude towards special interest group oriented legisla-
tion that is remarkably coherent and profound. Essentially, the Court is
saying that states can pass inefficient statutes that impede the market for
corporate control, but that doing so will not be costless. State legisla-
tures must be very careful to dot their i's and cross their t'. Put another
way, the Court is prepared to raise the costs that interest groups and
politicians must bear to obtain special interest group deals, but it is not
prepared to make such deals unconstitutional (that is, infinitely costly).
A plurality of the Supreme Court found three aspects of the Illinois
statute at issue in Edgar v. MITE to be objectionable on the grounds that
they directly conflicted with the Williams Act. First, the Court objected
to a provision in the statute that required outside offerors to provide in-
cumbent management with twenty days advance warning of a prospec-
tive bid. During this twenty day period, incumbent management would
be allowed to communicate its views on the impending offer to share-
holders, but the offerors could not publish their offers.76 This provision
was held invalid because it tipped the balance of power in takeover bat-
tles too heavily in favor of incumbent management. Particularly persua-
sive to the Court on this issue was the fact that Congress expressly had
considered and rejected proposals to impose precommencement disclo-
sure requirements on bidders on the grounds that such requirements
harmed shareholders. 77
The second flaw in the Illinois statute under review in MITE con-
cerned the Illinois Secretary of State's statutory right to call a hearing
with respect to any tender offer. Under the statute, whenever the Secre-
tary of State called a hearing, the offer would not be allowed to proceed
until the hearing was completed. The statute allowed the Secretary to
call a hearing at any time prior to the commencement of the offer, but
provided no deadline for the completion of the hearing. 7 This, of
course, allowed management "to stymie indefinitely a takeover."79 The
Court, recognizing that delay raises the costs of making an offer, rea-
76. MITE, 457 U.S. at 630-35.
77. Id. at 635.
78. Id. at 637.
79. Id.
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soned that the hearing provisions of the Illinois statute conflicted with
the Williams Act because the federal law was designed to ensure that
"investors and the takeover offeror would be free to go forward without
unreasonable delay." 80
Finally, the plurality in MITE objected to the fact that the statute's
hearing provisions permitted the Secretary of State to pass on the sub-
stantive fairness of the offer at the hearing and to deny registration of a
tender offer if he found that the offer was "inequitable." The Court
found this provision to be objectionable because it interfered with inves-
tor autonomy by depriving shareholders of their right to make their own
decisions with respect to a tender offer. 8'
On the preemption issue, the Court recognized that it was possible to
comply with both the provisions of the Williams Act and the provisions
of the Illinois law, but that the Illinois statute frustrated the objectives of
the Williams Act in a substantial way.82 Congress interpreted the Wil-
liams Act as a measure to protect investors. The Court noted that it was
"crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor was
to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder. '83 In fact,
it seems clear that the Williams Act is not in fact evenhanded. Rather,
the Act transfers wealth from shareholders of bidding firms to sharehold-
ers of target firms and aids incumbent management of target companies
in their efforts to remain independent.84
In other words, the Williams Act represents a special interest group
oriented statute designed to benefit incumbent management. But the
Court did not treat the statute like a special interest statute. The Court
treated the statute as though it were public-regarding, and on this basis
held that the Illinois statute was in conflict with it. Like many other
statutes, the interest group orientation of the Williams Act is not imme-
diately apparent on the statute's face or from its legislative history. 5
Special interest legislation often is drafted with a public-regarding gloss
in order to raise the costs to the public-and to rival groups-of discov-
ering the true effects of the legislation. 6 As Cass Sunstein has observed,
80. Id. at 639.
81. Id. at 639-40.
82. Id. at 626.
83. Id. at 633.
84. Fischel, supra note 51, at 13-14; Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Pro.
cess, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 131 (1987).
85. See Macey, supra note 65, at 251-56.
86. Id.
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a legislature often will engraft a "public value" onto a statute in order to
"justify the exercise of governmental power."'87
Layering a special interest group oriented statute with a public interest
gloss reduces the special interest groups' cost of persuading the legisla-
ture to vote for the special interest legislation because it reduces the legis-
lators' cost of supporting the legislation. By taking the statute's
articulated public purpose at face value, the Court, as it did in MITE,
often frustrates the efforts of special interest groups before the judiciary.
By interpreting the Williams Act as an even-handed statute rather than
as a pro-management statute, the Court found a conflict between the
publicly articulated purposes of the Williams Act and the effects of the
Illinois statute.
Thus, MITE clearly exemplifies the Court's use of traditional tech-
niques of statutory interpretation to produce results that thwart the abil-
ity of legislatures to make deals with special interest groups.
Unfortunately for shareholders, in CTS, the Supreme Court did not find
a conflict between the provisions of the Williams Act and the provisions
of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute. A twenty day advance
warning requirement was not available, and the statute did not empower
state officials to call hearings either to evaluate the merits of the offer or
to delay it. Instead, the Indiana legislature structured the statute so as to
prevent outside bidders from obtaining voting rights for the stock they
purchased, unless a majority of the investors who held target firm shares
prior to the outside offer voted to restore voting rights to the shares.
Unlike the Illinois statute at issue in MITE, the Indiana statute was
found to protect "the independent shareholder against the contending
parties. Thus, the Act furthers a basic purpose of the Williams Act,
'plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the takeover bidder.' "88
In addition, the Court in CTS was impressed by the fact that the legis-
lature had left the locus of decisionmaking power in the hands of the
shareholders, rather than in the hands of a third party, such as the Secre-
tary of State. 9 The fact that the Indiana statute was drafted to look like
a generic provision of state corporate law that regulated the voting rights
of shareholders and other strictly internal matters also seems signifi-
cant.90 The Court opined that these sorts of issues traditionally have
87. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1697 (1984).
88. CTS, 481 U.S. at 82.
89. Id. at 83-84.
90. Id. at 85-87, 93-94.
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been relegated to the states and was reluctant to interfere with the ability
of the states to define the rights and powers of locally chartered firms.91
Thus, the Court gave more latitude to the Indiana legislature than it
would have given to an administrative agency, such as the SEC, if it had
attempted to promulgate a statute that conflicted with the Williams Act.
For example, in SEC v. Chestmam,92 two judges on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated SEC rule 14e-3,
which attempted to interpret the Williams Act so as to interfere with the
market for corporate control by preventing people "in possession of ma-
terial, non-public information relating to a tender offer" from trading on
that information, even when such trading was not in violation of a fiduci-
ary duty.93 One judge concluded that the SEC exceeded its statutorily
granted authority by promulgating rule 14e-3 without any requirement
of a breach of a fiduciary duty.94 The other judge simply rewrote rule
14e-3 so as to contain a fiduciary duty requirement.95
Rule 14e-3 had the potential to interfere with the market for corporate
control by preventing market analysts and other market professionals
from trading on non-public information obtained from a tender offeror
when no breach of a fiduciary duty had occurred. Rule 14e-3's potential
for disrupting the market for corporate control was far less severe than
that presented by the Indiana statute in CTS, which could be used so as
to deprive a bidder of the right to vote the shares he acquired in a hostile
tender offer.
My purpose here is not to argue that the federal courts are acting as a
solid bastion against interest group wealth transfers. Rather, the point is
that the courts do not simply rubber stamp the deals that Congress and
interest groups contrive together. Subject to what is undeniably an ex-
cessive deference to the integrity of the legislative process, the courts
often thwart wealth transfers to interest groups by taking the legislature
at its word when it enacts statutes that claim to serve a public purpose.
The courts are unwilling, however, to substitute their own independent
economic judgment for that of the legislature. In CTS, the Court was
faced with competing policy arguments over the efficacy of hostile take-
overs. On one hand, the state of Indiana was arguing that its statute
91. Id. at 91.
92. 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.143(a) (1990).
94. 903 F.2d at 86.
95. Id. at 88.
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served the public interest by prohibiting coercive takeovers. On the other
hand, the appellee Dynamics Corporation was arguing that the prospect
of coercive offers is illusory and that tender offers generally should be
favored because they benefit society by reallocating corporate assets into
the hands of those management teams who can use them most
effectively. 96
In evaluating these opposing arguments, the Court refused to do any
analysis of the merits of either position, but rather accepted the opinion
of the Indiana legislature that the threat of coercive offers was a legiti-
mate threat that outweighed the benefits of an unfettered market for cor-
porate control.97 In his concurrence, Associate Justice Scalia provided
the most succinct statement of the Supreme Court's views on the advisa-
bility of second guessing otherwise constitutional economic statutes when
he said that "a law can be both economic folly and constitutional."98
While this willingness to defer to the legislature clearly restricts the
Court's role in blocking special interest legislation, it does not completely
destroy the role of the courts in protecting the public against such deals.
As seen above, the courts' commitment to traditional methods of statu-
tory interpretation effectively raises the costs to interest groups of effectu-
ating wealth transfer legislation by raising the likelihood that outcomes
such as those in Chestman and MITE, which invalidated welfare reduc-
ing interest group legislation, will be reached.
Results like CTS, of course, demonstrate the point made by Landes
and Posner that federal judges have declined to use their constitutional
powers to thwart interest group oriented deal making. But in order to
get a favorable result in CTS in 1987, incumbent management had to go
through a long and costly process, whose outcome was by no means cer-
tain, particularly after the decision in MITE. Despite the unfortunate
outcome, the process itself was welfare enhancing in several respects.
First, the uncertainty associated with these statutes made them less valu-
able to interest groups. Most states did not enact confiscatory antitake-
over statutes until after the CTS decision.9 9 This delay permitted
hundreds of welfare enhancing takeovers to go forward that would have
been blocked much earlier in the absence of the possibility of judicial
invalidation. In addition, the judicial scrutiny to which state antitake-
96. CTS, 481 U.S. at 92.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 96-97.
99. Macey, supra note 28, at 468.
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over statutes have been subjected has served the valuable purpose of pro-
viding information about the welfare reducing attributes of these statutes.
This information has been of use to shareholders who are more likely to
object to adoption of antitakeover statutes as a result of having been in-
formed of their consequences as a result of court decisions.
Similarly, the negative publicity afforded by a court decision discussing
the fact that these statutes serve to entrench incumbent management also
may have a beneficial effect. Most state antitakeover statutes permit
firms to opt out of their provisions. It seems probable that the informa-
tion and publicity that has accompanied court decisions on takeover stat-
utes has caused more firms to opt out of the provisions of these statutes
than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, even the modest intru-
sions into the legislative process currently being undertaken by courts
has some salutary effects on politicians.
IV. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, Congress could use its constitutional authority under
the commerce clause to preempt state corporate law entirely. Indeed in-
fluential commentators have advocated that Congress do just that. 1c
This Article has not addressed the interesting and important normative
question of whether federal law should displace state law. It has not
asked the equally interesting normative question of whether (or how far)
the SEC should be allowed to encroach on the traditional lawmaking
authority of the states. Instead, this Article has addressed what I hope is
the equally interesting and important, albeit positive question of why we
observe the particular allocation of authority that we do. I have argued
that Congress has refrained from preempting the field not out of some
altruistic, public-regarding notion that federalism serves the interests of
society generally or corporate shareholders in particular; rather, I argue
that the ability to confer or withhold regulatory authority from state offi-
cials is a considerable source of gain to politicians at the national level.
Congress, in other words, obtains political support from deferring regula-
tory authority to the states.
Similarly, I argue that the regulations promulgated by the SEC do not
take the shape that they do because of any independent policy assessment
by SEC bureaucrats on the general merits of a particular regulatory
100. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Jen-
nings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way?, 31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976).
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scheme. Rather, the SEC regulates in order to serve the interest groups
that compose its regular constituency. In particular, the SEC is attuned
to the needs of market professionals and to the needs of the organized
exchanges with whom the Commission has established a pattern of re-
peat dealings over time.
The states and the courts also fit the interest group framework of this
Article. The states are captured by incumbent management teams of the
public corporations chartered within their borders. The antitakeover re-
gimes that have become a central part of the corporate legal landscape
serve the interests of this group. These statutory schemes are contrary to
shareholder interests and to the economy as a whole, but the state legisla-
tors are indifferent to these costs. This indifference stems from the politi-
cians' ability to keep the benefits of these antitakeover statutes within the
borders of their states, while distributing the costs to taxpayers and
shareholders scattered throughout the country. Any state that passed a
takeover law that served shareholder interests rather than management
interests would simply be transferring wealth from local interest groups
to society generally. This would be political suicide.
Thus, the regulatory pattern that we observe is one that is completely
contrary to any conceivable public interest view of federalism.101 Under
any respectable public interest view of federalism, a state should not reg-
ulate so as to transfer wealth to its own citizens from citizens of other
states. And yet this is precisely the pattern that we observe in our federal-
ist system.
The single bright spot in the analysis presented here concerns the role
of the federal courts. The fact that federal judges are removed from the
political process means that, unlike politicians, they do not stand to gain
from passing statutes that benefit interest groups at the expense of the
public at large. As a consequence, the independent judiciary imposes
subtle costs on interest groups that seek to use the legislative process to
transfer wealth to themselves from the rest of society. While these costs
are not prohibitive to interest groups seeking wealth transfers, the fact
that such costs exist means that, at the margin, we observe less welfare
reducing legislation than we would in the absence of an independent
judiciary.
101. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design (Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484 (1987) (describing public interest justifications for federalism).
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss2/3
